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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In its Order Granting Motion for Review, the
Industrial Commission erroneously interpreted the legal
standards set forth in Allen v. Industrial Commission. 729
P.2d 15 (Utah 1986) for cases involving workers with a
preexisting condition aggravated by an industrial injury.

In

the absence of a newly enacted statute or appellate decision
subsequent to Allen, the Industrial Commission lacks the
equitable power to overturn Allen.

In the case at bar, the

Industrial Commission has attempted to create its own unique
"exception" to Allen, effectuating a substantial revision or

modification of that landmark decision.

Accordingly, a

correction-of-error standard should be applied on appeal, and
no deference should be given to the Industrial Commission's
interpretation.
One of the principal purposes of Allen was the
establishment of a "clear and workable rule for future
application by the Commission."

Id. at 18. The Industrial

Commission has, by this decision, destroyed this clear and
workable rule.

The exception which the Industrial Commission

has attempted to create with this decision is entirely
unworkable and creates significant confusion in an area where
none previously existed.

Finally, the record does not

support Ms. Shelley's contention that her preexisting condition
was solely caused by prior industrial injuries; rather,
Dr. Beck found that her preexisting condition was entirely
unrelated to the prior industrial injuries.

Even her treating

physicians noted that she had fully recovered from the prior
industrial injuries.

Nevertheless, the Industrial Commission

rendered its decision without requesting any medical evidence
or opinion on the critical issue of the case: the source of
Ms. Shelley's preexisting degenerative disc disease.

Without

medical evidence to establish the source of Shelley's
preexisting condition, even the Industrial Commission's
"exception" to Allen would not allow Shelley to obtain
benefits.

Therefore, the Industrial Commission's award of
-2-

benefits should be reversed and the decision of the
Administrative Law Judge reinstated.
A R G U M E N T
POINT I

BECAUSE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S ORDER INVOLVED A
GENERAL QUESTION OF LAW, A CORRECTION-OF-ERROR STANDARD IS
APPLIED ON REVIEW.
Respondent Shelley ("Shelley") concedes that her
activities at the time of the accident did not meet the
higher standard of legal causation (unusual or extraordinary
exertion) as outlined in Allen v. Industrial Commission,
supra.

Shelley also acknowledges that she was suffering from

a preexisting condition at the time of her 1985 industrial
accident.

The Utah Supreme Court in Allen stated that,

without exception, the higher standard of legal causation must
be established in cases involving preexisting conditions.
Despite this well-established law, Shelley maintains that it
was proper to reverse the decision of the Administrative Law
Judge and to modify Allen significantly in awarding her
benefits.
The Industrial Commission must follow Utah's workers
compensation statutes and the applicable case law
interpretation of those statutes.

The Industrial Commission's

actions in this instance involve the interpretation of a
question of law addressed in Allen.
-3-

Accordingly, as

reaffirmed by several recent decisions, a correction-of-error
standard is applied on appeal in reviewing interpretations of
general questions of law, and no deference is given to the
expertise of the Industrial Commission.

Bd. of Educ. of

Alpine Dist. v. Olsen, 684 P.2d 49, 51 (Utah 1984).
In Allen, the Utah Supreme Court interpreted Utah
Code Annotated § 35-1-45 which provides that a compensable
industrial claim must occur by "accident arising out of or in
the course of employment."

Id. at 18. The Court held that

to come within the ambit of Section 45, a worker has the burden
of establishing legal causation.

In the case at hand, Shelley

has acknowledged that she has not met her burden of
establishing the higher standard of legal causation required by
the court in Allen.

In the absence of legal causation, the

Industrial Commission cannot arbitrarily carve out exceptions
to the Allen decision to the effect that the higher standard
of legal causation need not be met when a preexisting condition
is due to prior industrial accidents with the same employer.
The Utah Supreme Court in Allen

made no

distinctions as to the source of a preexisting condition, and
specifically stated that the purpose of its decision in Allen
was to provide "a clear and workable rule for future
application by the Commission."

Id. at 18.

For the

Industrial Commission to ignore this clear and workable rule in
attempting to establish "exceptions" to a decision of the Utah
-4-

Supreme Court is an abuse of discretion, and this Court should
give no deference to the Industrial Commission in reviewing its
decision in this matter.
Significantly, Allen was decided by the Utah
Supreme Court in 1986. The Courts analysis in Allen
continues to be the standard for determining compensability of
workers compensation claims when preexisting conditions are
involved.

No exceptions to this "clear and workable" rule have

been implemented by legislative action or by any subsequent
appellate opinion.

Without such action, the Industrial

Commission does not have equitable powers to overturn or
modify Allen.

As this court stated in a recent opinion,

Bevans v. Industrial Commission, 131 Utah Adv. Rep. 99
(Utah App. 1990), the Industrial Commission is not a court of
equity, but must follow the applicable statutes and case law.
Id. at 101. The appropriate forum for a change in Utah's
statutes or case law is the legislature; it is not for the
Industrial Commission to carve out "exceptions."

The Allen

decision has been in existence for over four years, and the
legislature has not taken any steps or enacted any legislation
to narrow its parameters.

Thus, the Industrial Commission must

follow the guidelines outlined in Allen.
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POINT II
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO SUPPORT
SHELLEY'S CLAIM THAT HER PREEXISTING BACK CONDITION
IS DUE SOLELY TO HER WORK ACTIVITIES AT FRED MEYER.
The medical evidence available to the Industrial
Commission revealed that Shelley suffered from a ratable
preexisting impairment.

The only doctor to render an opinion

as to the source of Shelley's preexisting degenerative disc
disease was Dr. R. David Beck.

At the request of the

Administrative Law Judge, Shelley submitted to an independent
medical examination from Dr. Beck, an orthopedic surgeon, on
October 2, 1987. Dr. Beck examined Shelley's previous
medical records before concluding that half of Shelley's
permanent impairment was attributable to the May 6, 1985
industrial injury, and "half to preexisting conditions
including disease."

Dr. Beck went on to state that "the

injuries of 1975 and 1978 probably have no bearing on her
long-term problem."

R. at 294, emphasis supplied.

Thus,

while Shelley claims that Dr. Beck was merely expressing his
"opinion" in this regard, the evidence reveals that Dr. Beck
was asked by the Administrative Law Judge to conduct this
exam.

Moreover, Dr. Beck had access to all of Shelley's

medical records in conducting his examination.
Significantly, after Dr. Beck's report was
received, Shelley requested an evaluation by a formal medical
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panel.

However, she failed to appear for that examination.

Thus, the only medical evidence and testimony before the
Administrative Law Judge (and, subsequently, the Industrial
Commission) in relation to Shelley's medical condition came
from Dr. Beck.

Had Shelley desired to refute those findings,

she needed to attend the medical panel examination (or procure
a second medical opinion on her own behalf).

Having not done

so, she cannot now contend that her preexisting conditions were
clearly caused by the previous industrial injuries of 1975 and
1978.
In fact, Shelley's treating physicians acknowledged
that she fully recovered from both the 1975 and 1978 industrial
injuries.

Dr. J. Charles Rich stated:
It is interesting that 10 or 11 years ago
she was off work for about 3 weeks under
the care of Dr. Hargreaves when she
injured her back at work, had physical
therapy, and then went back to work at the
end of about three weeks. Again in 1979
[1978] she saw you because of an injury
which occurred at work but she only missed
part of one day, had some physical therapy
but worked at the same time, and then has
been doing satisfactorily until 05/03/85.

Report of Dr. Rich dated June 13, 198 5.
supplied.)

(R. at 216, emphasis

Dr. William Allred also noted:

The patient has had hypertension for 16
years. She is status post a hysterectomy
for dysfunctional uterine bleeding and also
at the time of her hysterectomy she had
-7-

repair of a cystocele and rectocele. She
has had a long history of a hiatal hernia
with severe chest pain, secondary to the
hiatal hernia and she is status post on
elbow injury as well as two previous back
injuries at the time of work, however, the
symptoms did not persist after these
injuries and improved with conservative
therapy.
History and Physical Examination of Dr. Allred dated July 22,
1985. (R. at 264, emphasis supplied.)

Thus, any claim that

Shelley's current condition resulted from a preexisting
condition related to each of these injuries is merely
speculation and cannot properly be the basis upon which the
Industrial Commission attempted to create an "exception" to the
well-established rule in Allen.

Moreover, in Jones v.

California Packing Corp., 244 P.2d 640, 644 (Utah 1952), the
Utah Supreme Court stated that the law does not vest the
Commission with the "arbitrative power to disbelieve or
disregard uncontradicted, competent, credible evidence."
The Administrative Law Judge, in reaching his
decision below, received no prior guidelines or direction from
the Industrial Commission as to its unusual interpretation of
Allen.

Accordingly, neither any of the parties nor the

Administrative Law Judge attempted to address the issue of the
source of Shelley's preexisting conditions.

Even assuming,

arguendo, the legitimacy of the Industrial Commission's
"exception," for the Industrial Commission to have properly
implemented this exception, it should have remanded the case to
-8-

the Administrative Law Judge for a specific medical finding as
to the source of Shelley's preexisting conditions.

(This

assumes, of course, that the Industrial Commission disbelieved
or disregarded the specific opinion of Dr. Beck already in the
record.)

Without a specific medical finding to support its

"exception," the Industrial Commission can only speculate as to
whether Shelley's degenerative spondylolisthesis is due solely
to prior employment activities or to nonindustrial factors.
POINT III
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S RULING IN THIS CASE IS
AN UNWORKABLE PRECEDENT FOR FUTURE CASES.
The Industrial Commission has attempted to create an
"exception" to the well-established law in Allen because
Shelley's condition may have been related to prior
work-related injuries with the same employer.

Even assuming,

arguendo, that the Industrial Commission's assumption is
accurate, the solution is remarkably unworkable for future
cases.

For example, it treats employees with identical medical

conditions in a greatly disparate manner.

One employee might

receive benefits for an injury merely by remaining with the
same employer; another employee, with an identical injury and
medical history, would go without benefits if he or she, by
pure chance, happened to switch to a different employer, even
if the new employer were in the exact same business.

If the

Industrial Commission's ruling were taken to its logical
-9-

extremef even Shelley would not receive benefits in this
case.

Specifically, Shelley's 1975 and 1978 injuries arose

while working for Grand Central, While not by Shelley's
choice, her employer changed to Fred Meyer upon Fred Meyer's
acquisition of Grand Central.

From a workability standpoint,

the eff€ict of this change of employment is the same as if
Shelley had voluntarily moved from Grand Central to Fred Meyer
(or to a ShopKo or K-Mart) and continued to perform identical
duties.

Because of this change in Shelley's employer, a strict

reading of the Industrial Commission's analysis would be
sufficient to deny her all benefits.
An even more difficult problem with the Industrial
Commission's analysis relates to the legal standard of
causation that would be applied in any particular case.

For

example, if an employee, suffering from a congenital condition,
aggravated that condition in an initial industrial injury, what
legal standard of causation would be applied in the event that
same employee suffered a second industrial injury with the same
employer?

Would the higher standard of legal causation

espoused in Allen govern inasmuch as the employee
unquestionably suffered from a congenital preexisting
condition?

Or, would the lower standard espoused by the

Industrial Commission apply because the latter industrial
injury might be related to the initial industrial injury?
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Or,

would there be some type of intermediate standard of legal
causation?
While the Industrial Commission in the present case
has attempted to carve out some type of "equitable exception"
to Allen, the far-reaching effects of this "exception" reveal
the obvious weaknesses in the Industrial Commission's
decision.

When the Supreme Court established its "clear and

workable" rule in Allen, the purpose of that rule was to
avoid the exact problems that the Industrial Commission is
encountering with its decision in this case.

The Allen

decision has governed for over four years without the confusion
brought on by the Industrial Commission in this decision.
Therefore, the Industrial Commission's decision should be
overturned and the Administrative Law Judge's Order should be
reinstated.

Only through this action can the Allen standards

remain "clear and workable."

CONCLUSION
In the case at bar, the Industrial Commission has
attempted to create an "exception" to the Utah Supreme
Court's landmark decision in Allen.

This action by the

Industrial Commission is based entirely on its legal
interpretation of Allen, and no deference should be given to
its decision.

The Industrial Commission is not a court of

equity, and must enforce the case law and statutes as they
-11-

presently exist.

In this instance, the Industrial Commission

has utterly failed to do so.
Furthermore, this decision provides no guidance or
direction as to the appropriate legal standard of causation to
be applied in future cases.

Rather, it creates chaos.

Therefore, this court, applying a correctness-of-error standard
of review, should reverse the decision of the Industrial
Commission and reinstate the Administrative Law Judge's prior
Order.
DATED this

of May, 1990.
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSON
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Attorneys for Petitioners
Fred Meyer and/or Liberty
Mutual Insurance Company
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Phillip B. Shell, Esq.
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